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Early this year, a British-Palestinian journalist, Faris Glubb, was refused a visa to visit 
Australia for a speaking tour. The decision was in keeping with the policy of both Liberal 
and Labor governments of excluding Palestinian speakers from Australia.
The only exception to this ban was the 1976 tour by two members of the General Union of 
Palestinian Students. Ironically, they were admitted by then Foreign M inister Andrew 
Peacock — mainly because the Libera! government was keen to increase trade with Arab 
countries such as Egypt and Iraq.
The Labor Party's M iddle East policy, developed under the Whitlam government, was 
posed as more "even handed" than the Liberals pro-Israel policy. In opposition, Labor held 
some talks with the Palestinians (Bill Hayden met Yasser Arafat in 1981) and called for the 
withdrawal of Australian troops from the Sinai. A lthough calling for a "just so lu tion" to the 
Palestinian problem, ALP policy has stopped short of recognition of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation — even after many European social-dem ocratic and conservative 
governments did so.
ALP policy has always been sensitive to the pro-Israeli lobby in Australia. This has meant 
a less than even-handed interpretation of the ir "even-handed" policy. But even this policy 
was destined to change with the victory of Hawke over Hayden as ALP leader, followed by 
his victory in the election. Bob Hawke admires Isreal greatly, and he qu ickly instituted a 
review of Labor policy.
Labor's promise to w ithdraw from the Sinai "peace keeping" force was dishonoured 
within weeks, after Hayden held talks with the Israelis, the Egyptians and the United States. 
In the United Nations, Australia continues to vote as close as possible to Israeli and United 
States wishes, despite the shift in international opinion towards recognition of Palestinian 
rights.
And, as Faris Glubb has shown, the Hawke government continues the "b ipartisan" policy 
of Australian governments of banning all spekaers who are even vaguely associated with 
the PLO. In this article, ALI KAZAK argues the case for Australian government recognition 
of the PLO ....
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r here seems to be widespread a g re e m e n t  th a t  A u s t ra l ia 's  approach to the recognition of 
t h e  P a l e s t i n i a n  L i b e r a t i o n  
Organisation should be based on the 
assumption that its fundamental 
interests lie in a just and lasting peace 
in the area. Feelings run very strongly 
in that part of the world. The conflicts 
within the region are overlaid by 
power struggles between East and 
West, and it would be very easy fo r a  
regional quarrel to develop into a 
general confrontation.
The question that must be posed 
and answered therefore is whether 
recognition of the PLO would enhance 
or diminish the chances for peace.
Support for the PLO
A  t the outset, we conlronl the 
/ \  extraordinary fact, given the 
existence of the recognition 
controversy, that there seems to be no 
doubt in almost anyone's mind that 
the PLO is in fact the sole legitimate 
representative o f  the Palestinian 
people.
All available evidence supports this 
fact. A 1982 poll of West Bank 
Palestinians, commissioned by Time 
magazine and conducted by the Tel 
Aviv Pub lic  O p in io n  R esearch  
Institute, revealed that >46 percent 
favoured "a Palestinian state run 
solely by the PLO" (Time. 24 May, 
1 9 8 2 ) .  T h e  J e r u s a l e m  P o s t  
( i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e d i t i o n ,  2 0 -2 6  
February, 1983) reported a February 
1983 poll of West Bank opinion 
showing "massive backing for Arafat" 
to the extent of 90 percent. And a 
recent book on the West Bank by an 
Israeli journalist ( IVest Bank Story b\ 
Rafik Halabi. reviewed by Bernard 
Avishai in the New York Review o f  
Books, 10 June, 1982) cites and 
concurs with the statement by a 
Palestinian journalist that "There are 
two camps on the West Bank today — 
Pl.O  supporters and PLO members".
In addition to these empirical 
findings and observations, we have the 
singular fact that nobody other than 
the PLO even claims to speak for the 
Palestin ian  people. F o r  serious 
observers of the Middle East conllict, 
there is no question of splitting the 
Palestinian people from the P l.t) .  As 
even Labor federal parliamentarian 
Ralph Jacobi remarked on 7 May,
1 9 8 4 _ " j h e  political basis of the PI O is 
the predicament of the Palestinian 
people".
If the PLO is. in Fact, the 
representative of the Palestinian 
people, how can Australia refuse to 
recognise it as such and at the same 
time support its right to participate in 
negotiations to determine their future? 
Not only does such a contradictory 
position smack strongly ol insincerity 
on Australia's part, but it also places 
great obstacles in Australia 's way if we 
want to play any role in aiding or 
encouraging negotiations leading to 
real peace. To find out what 
Palestinians really want, one must 
listen to and talk with theLr real 
representatives. Negotiations that 
ex c lu d e  the  PLO  e x c lu d e  the 
Palestinians.
The Australian government seems 
to realise the inconsistency of the 
position and attem pts to resolve it by 
having diplomatic contact with the 
PLO (outside Australia) but not 
recognition.
The government has refused to 
grant a visa to Palestinian journalist 
Faris Glubb to tour Australia, and w ill 
exclude the overwhelming majority of 
Palestinians (who support the PLO) 
from obtaining a visa because, 
"Consistent with its firm opposition to 
the use of force, the Government did 
not agree to a visit by a propagandist 
for an organisation some of whose 
c o n s t i tu e n t  m em b ers  engage  in 
v i o l e n c e ,  a n d  p u b l i c l y  c l a im  
attrribution for acts o f  terrorism". 
Putting to one side the question of 
"terrorism" (which we shall deal with 
shortly), this policy stance has not 
been evident in the visits to Australia 
o f  re p re se n ta t iv e s  of  n u m e ro u s  
n a t i o n a l - m i l i t a r y  r e s i s t a n c e  
organsiations, ranging from the 
Afghani Mujahedecn to SW A PO , the 
1RA or groups in the Pacific, Asia and 
Centra! America, In particular, the 
representative of the neo-fascist 
Lebanese Phalange, Naoum Farah. 
was warmly received by Prime Minis­
ter Bob Hawke on 13 September 1984, 
j u s t  d a y s  b e fo re  (he s e c o n d  
anniversary of the massacre of 
Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and 
Shatila camps by the Phalange, 
assisted by the Israel Defence Forces.
Since Australia places no such 
artificial limits on its contact with 
Israel, i t  is inevitable L h a t  we are 
getting a  one-sided and inaccurate 
understanding of the situation as a
whole. Even if non-recognition were 
merely symbolic, and it is hard to see 
how it could be. it would involve 
Australia in a dangerous game of 
failing to encourage negotiations with 
the real parlies, making it all the less 
likely that any negotiations will occur 
and, even if they do, that the results 
will bear any relation to Palestinian 
aspirations. It is hard to see how a just 
and lasting peace could be achieved in 
those circumstances.
Following Israel's Wishes
Of the various reasons offered to justify Australia's position, there is one deserving attention 
at the outset, because it seems, for 
many people, to override all other 
considerations. Ii is the claim that 
Australia should not recognise the 
PLO  because Israel refuses to 
negotiate with the PLO.
In the first place, it is not true lhat all 
parties in Israel oppose recognition ol 
the PLO. Not only do Rakah and the 
Progressive List for Peace, parties 
with a mostly Palestinian base and six 
members in the Knesset, support 
recognition of the Pl .O. but so doesu 
growing body of Jewish opinion in 
Israel.
In January  1982. three promineni 
Israelis (editor Uri Avnery, Reserve 
General Mattitiyahu Peled and lormer 
finance ministry  director-general 
Yaacov Arnon). leaders ol the Council 
lor Israeli-Palestinian Peace and 
members o f  the Sheli party, had 
oilicial talks in I unis with PLO leader 
Yasser Aralat. According to the 
Jerusalem Post (international edition 
of 23-29 January , 1982). Peled said on 
Israeli television after the talks that he 
was "convinced the PL.O's activities 
were now aimed at reaching peace bj 
establishing two states - Israel and a 
Palestinian state side by side".
While Israel's government and 
major parties are opposed to peace 
negotiations with the PLO, Jewish 
opinion in Israel is far from monolithic 
in this regard. Ii would be a graveerrof 
to allow Israel's refusal to deal with the 
PLO on fundamental issues to 
determine Australia 's policy.
i he basic reason lor this is Israel's 
claim, on religious and historical 
grounds, to all of Palestine and id 
systematic effort to overwhelm th 
Palestinian population by settlement 
and land acquisition, t his has been th 
claim and aim of the Zionist 
movement from its inception to the
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present day. Given this goal, and 
altogether apart from the question of 
its legitimacy or legality, and given 
I s r a e l 's  o v e r w h e lm in g  m i l i t a r y  
superiority in the region, obviously it 
would be in Israel's pure self-interest 
not to  deal with the PLO precisely 
b e c a u s e  it is th e  o n l y  re a l  
representative of  the Palestinian 
people, especially since Israel is well 
aware of the Palestinians' sovereign 
aspirations in the West Bank and Gaza
Refusing to deal with the PLO is a 
way of avoiding negotiations with the 
Palestinian people altogether, perhaps 
forever, or at least until sufficient 
"facts on the ground" have been 
created. If this is the case, Australia is 
playing directly into Israel’s hands. 
"R eject io n i s m " ,  a te rm  o f te n  
misapplied to the PLG and Arab 
states, should refer to Israel and the 
United States who have, as Noam 
Chomsky well illustrates in The 
Fateful Triangle ( Pluto Press, 1983). 
r e je c te d  th e  w ell  e s t a b l i s h e d  
international consensus on a Middle 
East solution.
The Question of "Terrorism"
A notlier recurring theme has 
AM been the quest ion of  
"terrorism". I he PLO has long 
been characterised by Israel as a 
"terrorist organisation", no doubt in 
part to suggest that it has no organic 
relation to the Palestinians, but also to 
give grounds for Israel's refusal todcal 
with it. Israel seems to claim a moral 
right not to negotiate with the PLO 
either because, as "terrorists", they are 
morally in fe r io r  to the Israeli 
government or because the wrongs
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which, as "terrorists", they have 
committed against Israelis grant Israel 
the right to refuse to deal with the 
culprits as a sort of retribution.
Without entering into a discussion 
of any acts of Palestinian violence 
a g a in s t  Is rae lis ,  a n d  c o n ced in g  
arguendo the blackest picture Israel 
could paint of these acts, can the 
Israeli government really claim moral 
superiority, given that its leaders were 
wanted for terrorism by the British
responsible for many acts of terror 
such as the bombing of the King David 
Hotel in 1946 and them assacreat Deir 
Yassin in 1948? Remember that these 
events took place many years before 
the PLO was even founded.
Can the government that carried out 
the brutal bombing of Beirut in 1982, 
which left tens of thousands of 
Palestinian and Lebanese civilians 
dead, claim that the balance of 
righteousness o r  injury is on its side? 
Can the Israeli government make this 
claim after being held responsible by 
its own judiciary lor the massacre of 
Sabra and Shatila, two days and 
nights ol hell on earth that left at least 
800 Palestinians dead? This minimum 
estimate is more than twice as high as 
the claims made by the opponents of 
recognition for total Israeli deaths 
attributed to the PLO. In his book on 
the war, the then Israeli Jacobo 
Timerman wrote that in July 1982 
alone (i.e. not counting the massacre 
of Sabra and Shatila), "more children 
were killed in Beirut than during thirty 
years of terrorism in Israel", ( The 
Longest War. p. 140), It is important to 
remember that it was the Israeli claim 
that the PLO was merely a "terrorist
organisation" with no link to the 
Palestinian people that led directly to 
this tragedy. It could only have 
occu rred  a g a in s t  a p o p u la t io n  
rendered defenceless by a two-month 
siege aimed precisely at dislodging its 
only defenders.
Even if Australia should disagree 
with the means used by the PLO in the 
past, this is no basis for refusing to 
recognise and deal with it as the 
representative of the Palestinians, 
especially since Australia continues to 
deal with Israel despite all the features 
ol Israeli policy towards Palestinians 
that Australia finds objectionable.
Israel's "Right to Exist"
r he Australian government has s u g g e s te d  t h a t  it w ou ld  recognise the PLO only if the 
PLO would recognise the existence of 
Israel. This, of course, is the position 
of the US government, as set out in the 
Memorandum o f  Agreement between 
Yigal Allon, Israel's then foreign 
minister, and Henry Kissinger in 
September 1975, which staled that the 
United States "will not recognise or 
negotiate with the PLO so long as the 
PLO does not recognise Israel's right 
to exist and does not accept Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338". 
This issue seems to have two distinct 
aspects, one having to do with Israel's 
"security" and the other with a kind of 
moral assent by the PLO to the 
legitimacy of the state of Israel,
The word "right" is of crucial 
significance here, because what is 
being asked of the PL.O is not that it 
merely recognise the fact of existence, 
even in the sense of entering peace 
negotiations that could ultimately lead 
to the peaceful existence of two stales, 
but that the PLO accord moral 
legitimacy of the Zionist movement 
and the establishment of the state of 
Israel.
Such a precondition is really an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p h e n o m e n o n ,  
apparently unknown to international 
law and practice. Is Australia required 
to grant moral legitimacy to every 
regime and state with which it has 
relations? Is such moral assent entailed 
by having such relations, so that we 
must be taken to approve of every state 
with which we deaf? Of course not. So 
it is hard to see why recognition of the 
"right" of Israel to exist should be at all 
relevant as a precondition to the 
recognition of the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian
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people. Certainly Australia has 
relations with many states, including 
most of the Arab stales, that do not 
recognise Israel.
II the Palestinians feel aggrieved by 
the creation of the state of Israel in 
their midst and the general disaster for 
them that has followed the advent of 
Zionism in the region (and can anyone 
deny that they have at least some 
grounds for this grievance?), and if 
they project a vision of a secular 
democratic Palestine or express a 
desire for the status quo ante, should 
they be forced to abandon their vision 
if there are sufficient objective 
guarantees that they will not seek to 
impose it by force'.' In any event, why 
should they be forced to abandon it 
before they are offered anything in 
r e tu rn ,  as  a p re c o n d i t io n  for  
negotiations?
In 1937. David Ben Gurion .a  leader 
of the Zionist movement, said:
The acceptance o f  partition does not 
commit us to renounce Trans-Jordan; one 
does not dem andfrom  anybody to give up 
his vision. We shall accept a stale in the 
b o u n d a r ie s  f i x e d  to d a y , h u t the  
boundaries o f  Zionist aspirations are the 
concern o f  the Jewish people and no 
external factor will be able to limit them. 
(Zichronot , Memoirs,, Volume 4 [ 1937]. 
Tel Aviv Am Ovtrd Publishers, 1974. p. 
151.)
And of course in 1947, Menahem 
Begin said of the partition resolution;
The partition o f  the homeland is illegal. It 
will never be recognised. The signature o f  
institutions and indi viduals o f  the partition 
agreement is invalid. It will not bind the 
Jewish people. Jerusalem wax and will 
forever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be 
restored to the people o f  Israel. A ll o f  it. 
A nd forever. (Menahem Begin, The 
Revolt, Revised Edition. New York. Dell 
Publishing Company Inc.. 1977, p. 433.)
Australia does not make it a 
condition of recognition of Israel that 
it abandon these claims. Australia 
continues to stand by Israel even as 
I s r a e l  i m p o s e s  th e m  o n  th e  
P a l e s t i n i a n s  by fo rc e .  I s r a e l 's  
hypocrisy in these circumstances in 
refusing to deal with the PLO on the 
grounds that it does not recognise 
Israel's right to  exist is manifest. How 
can Australia make it a condition of  
recognition of the P I .0  that it first 
grant moral assent to the legitimacy of 
a continuing attack on its national 
existence?
A list of addresses of Palestine 
support groups in each state and 
New Zealand is printed on page 2.
in addition, Australia should not 
forget that Israel has indicated more 
than once that it would not recognise 
the PLO even if the PLO were to 
recognise Israel. Conservative Israeli 
governments have already given 
explicit support to the policy of Labor 
g o v e r n m e n t s ,  w h ich  is " t o t a l  
opposition to negotiation with the 
PLO even if the latter recognises the 
state o f  Israel and its right to exist and 
stops terror acts altogether". ( Davar, 4 
July, 1975.) Israeli Cabinet Secretary 
Dan Meridor declared in early 1984 
that "Israel has reiterated it will never 
negotiate with the PLO even if the 
guerrilla organisation recognised the 
Jew ish  s ta te 's  r igh t to  ex is t" .  
(Australian Jewish News, 16 March, 
1984.)
Numerous other national resistance 
movements, which do not recognise 
the regimes they oppose, are not 
treated by the Australian government 
the way the PLO has been.
The fatal flaw in UN Resolution 
242, so far as the Palestinians are 
concerned, is that it does not recognise 
the Palestinians at all. Add to this the 
n u m e ro u s  UN re s o lu t io n s  noi 
recognised by Israel (including the
Palestine partition resolution itself 
and the resolution admitting Israel to 
the UN on the condition that the 
Palestinian refugees be allowed to 
return home), and the real double 
standard seems to  be operating in the 
requirement that the PLO must first 
recognise Resolution 242 before it will 
be recognised as the representative of 
the Palestinians,
The whole issue of recognition is 
b a se d  on  a c o m p le t e ly  false 
reciprocity. The PLO is being asked lo 
recognise Israel's right to exist, notasa 
condition ol the right of a Palestinian 
stale to  exist, but as a condition of the 
right o f  the PLO lo represent the 
Palestinians, In return for this, the 
PLO should in fairness be asked only 
to recognise the right of the Israeli 
g o v e rn m e n t  to  r e p re s e n t  non- 
Palestinian Israelis, in other words, I 
the right o f  non-Palestinian Israelis to I 
choose their own representatives. But, , 
of course, nobody suggests that the j 
PLO has ever refused to do this.
The PLO has more than once 
expressed iis willingness to negotiate I 
an  accommodation that could include 
peaceful coexistence, more recently in I
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the endorsement by the Palestine 
National Council ol the September 
1982 Fez plan. That plan envisages 
withdrawal from the 1967-occupied 
territories and the dismantling of all 
Israeli settlements established since 
then , the  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of  an 
independent Palestinian state and 
"formalising guarantees for peace 
am ong all states in the region 
including the independent Palestinian 
state". But even the PLO's ultimate 
vision, made in the form of an official 
offer by chairman Arafat at the United 
Nations in 1974, for a "democratic 
stale where Christians, Jews and 
Muslims live in justice, equality, 
fraternity and progress" including "all 
Jews now living in Palestine who 
choose to live with us there in peace 
and without discrimination", is more 
than any Israeli government has ever 
offered to the Palestinians.
Israel's "Security"
pa rated from the question of 
moral recognition, it is hard to 
see how Israel's "security" could 
bean  obstacle to negotiations with the 
real P a le s t in ia n  rep re sen ta t iv es .  
Naturally, a major aspect of any talks 
would have lo be the security of both 
parties, but it is hard to see how the 
talks themselves could threaten Israeli 
security.
In fact, it seems that the notion of a 
Palestinian state is often perceived to 
be the threat, and recognition of the 
PLO is feared merely because it might 
lead lo the creation of such a state. 
Two responses can be made to this 
view.
Firstly, Australia must be even - 
handed in its concern for human 
security. Could anything be clearer 
from the events in Lebanon in 1982 
than that it is Palestinian security that 
is endangered by the lack ol a state?
Secondly, what does Israel, the 
w o r ld 's  f o u r th - r a n k in g  m ili ta ry  
power, have to fear from a new 
Palestinian state? More importantly, 
would not a Palestinian state give 
som e m easu re  ol d ig n i ty  and 
satisfaction to a people accustomed to 
the dependency, desperation and 
frustration of nearly lour decades of 
refugee marginality. and wouldn't this 
be the best objective guarantee of 
security for everyone in the region?
If fear of the possible eventuality ol 
a Palestinian state is the ground on 
which Israel refuses to recognise or 
negotiate with the PLO. it has nothing
at all to do with security, and can only 
be related to the pursuit by force of the 
sell-interested Israeli claim mentioned 
earlier to dominion over all of 
Palestine, including the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, at the expense of the 
Palestinian inhabitants.
Conclusion
T one of the reasons advanced for 
/  Israel's refusal to negotiate 
with the PLO stands up to close 
scrutiny and certainly none can serve 
as a basis for Australia's refusal to 
recognise the PLO, or to refuse 
Palestinian representatives the right 
even lo be heard in this country.
Israel's refusal to negotiate with the 
PLO, even if the PLO recognises 
Israel, seems to be part of its strategy 
to extend the dominion of the Jewish 
state to include all of Palestine.
Israel's policy of delcgitimising the 
PLO has been the basis for all of its 
attempts to eradicate Palestinian 
nationalism and aspirations, from the 
banning of the Palestinian flag 
throughout the territory occupied by 
Israel and the dismissal of faculty 
members of West Bank universities 
who do not disavow the PLO in 
writing, through to the slaughter of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon in the name of 
eliminating the PLO. These actions 
are only rendered defensible by the 
artificial splitting of ihe PLO from the 
Palestinian people, and they are 
indeed necessitated (from Israel's 
purely selfish point of view) because 
the PLO is so closely bound up with 
Palestinian nationalism and expresses 
il so well.
Over a hundred UN member slates 
currently recognise the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinians, 
including Austria, China, Greece, 
India, Jo rdan . I.ebanon, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan. Turkey, the USSR and 
Tanzania (who accord the PLO full 
diplomatic status), and Belgium, 
Brazil, Finland, France, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru and 
Spain (who accord it political 
r e c o g n i t io n  w i th o u t  d ip lo m a t ic  
status). In June 1980, nine heads of 
slates of the European Economic 
Community accepted the PLO as one 
of the participants that musl be 
included in peace negotiations. This 
was reaffirmed by them in March 
1983. And, of course, the UN General 
Assembly resolved in 1974 that the 
PLO was the "representative of  the 
Palestinian people" and in 1975 the
General Assembly and the Security 
Council invited the PLO to participate 
in that capacity in all matters relating 
to the Middle East.
A  ustralia's failure to recognise 
y /M  the PL.O as the sole legitimate 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  
P a le s t in ia n  peo p le  a ids  Is rae l 's  
charade. Australia's recognition of the 
PLO would help bring peace to the 
region.
How? Lasting peace in the Middle 
East cannot be imposed. It can only 
come through negotiations, and the 
key to breaking the current impasse is 
to take steps to bring the parties 
together. It is obvious that the 
Palestinians have everything to gain 
from such a process. That is why the 
PLO is willing, and has been willing 
since 1974, to enter into negotiations 
without preconditions.
On the other hand, given the terrible 
military blows it has inflicted on the 
Palestinians and the complete control 
it exercises over the territories in issue. 
Israel has little or no incentive to 
negotiate or compromise on the 
fundamental issues. Israel is buying 
time in the hope of extinguishing all 
hope of Palestinian sovereignty. This 
is precisely the goal of its settlement 
policy. A stalemate is in Israel's 
interest, and time is on its side.
As one of Israel's staunchest friends 
over the years, Australia is in a 
position to give Israel some incentive 
to  n e g o t i a t e  by  r e f u s i n g  to  
countenance its attempts lo avoid 
negotiations with the Palestinians 
through the PLO. Recognising the 
PLO is one of the few concrete steps, 
and certainly the least drastic, that 
Australia can take in the interests of 
peace. Not only will it indicate our 
unwillingness to contemplate Israel's 
plans for the area, but more 
importantly il will give considerable 
solace and encouragement to those 
courageous forces within Israeli 
society who are genuinely interested in 
peace, but who, when they make 
contact with the PLO to have 
discussions that are so necessary, are 
branded "traitors" by the Israeli 
government.
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